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SHORTER ARTICLE
SUBSIDIARITY AFTER LISBON: REINFORCING
THE SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM?
ROBERT SCHU¨TZE*
I. INTRODUCTION
“[T]HREE correcting words of the legislator and entire libraries are
turned into maculature.”1 Worse: three additional words and entire
libraries will be filled again! Libraries have literally been filled since the
introduction of the “principle of subsidiarity” into the European legal
order.2
Subsidiarity – the quality of being “subsidiary” – derives from sub-
sidium. The Latin concept evolved in the military context. It re-
presented an “assistance” or “aid” that stayed in the background.
Figuratively, an entity is subsidiary where it provides a “subsidy” – an
assistance of subordinate or secondary importance. In political phil-
osophy, the principle of subsidiarity came to represent the idea “that a
central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only
those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate
or local level”.3 The principle was invoked in 1891 by the Catholic
Church and received its celebrated form forty years later in the
Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno.4 When did the subsidiarity principle
become a constitutional principle? The legal principle of subsidiarity
emerged as a – contested – principle of German constitutional law.5
* Durham Law School.
1 J.H. von Kirchmann, Die Werthlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft (Berlin 1848), 23.
2 For an overview of the – abundant – literature, see R. Schu¨tze, Form Dual to Cooperative
Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law (Oxford 2009, forthcoming), chapter 5.
3 Oxford English Dictionary: “subsidiary” and “subsidiarity”.
4 The principle that responsibility should be gradually organised into ever larger social groupings
had not been invented by the Catholic Church (cf. K. Endo, Subsidiarity and its Enemies: To what
Extent is Sovereignty contested in the Mixed Commonwealth of Europe, EUI RCS Working Paper
2001/24 at 9). However, the idea of subsidiary social organisations re-emerged with the Encyclical
“Rerum Novarum” (Of New Things, 1891) and – forty years later – in Quadragesimo Anno:
Encyclical of the Pope Pius XI on Reconstruction of the Social Order, especially: paras.79–80. For an
analysis of the application of the subsidiarity principle inside the Church, see J. Komonchak,
“Subsidiarity in the Church: The State of the Question” (1988) 48 The Jurist 298.
5 On the German constitutional principle of subsidiarity, see J. Issensee, Subsidiarita¨tsprinzip und
Verfassungsrecht (Berlin 2001).
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And, it is through the medium of German constitutionalism that the
principle of subsidiarity enters into the European legal order.6
The Community principle of subsidiarity surfaces in 1975,7 but
would only find official expression in the text of the EC Treaty after the
Single European Act (1986). The (then) newly inserted Article 130 r (4)
EEC restricted Community environmental legislation to those actions
whose objectives could “be attained better at Community level than at
the level of the individual Member States”. The Treaty on European
Union (1992) finally lifted the subsidiarity principle beyond its en-
vironmental confines. It became a general constitutional principle of
the European Union. Article 5 (2) EC states: “In areas that do not fall
within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of
the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community”. This for-
mulation was ambiguous, and subsequent constitutional clarifications
culminated in a special Protocol on the Application of the Principles
of Subsidiarity and Proportionality added by the Amsterdam Treaty
(1997).8
Despite its literary presence, the principle of subsidiarity has re-
mained a subsidiary principle of European constitutionalism. Why?
The reason for its shadowy existence lies in the continued absence of
clear conceptual contours. While the principle’s ambiguity may have
“save[d] Maastricht”,9 its protean character defied concrete appli-
cation as a new safeguard against European centralisation. If sub-
sidiarity was everything to everyone, how should the Community
institutions apply it? Furthermore, the assessment of subsidiarity has,
in the past, been largely left to the Community legislator. This con-
stitutional arrangement meant that subsidiarity was not taken very
seriously by European constitutionalism.10 In the light of this failure,
various reforms were proposed to strengthen the subsidiarity principle
as a “safeguard of federalism”.11 Two reform options crystallised in the
last decade. The first option concentrates on the procedural nature
of the principle and attempts to reinforce subsidiarity as a political
6 Ibid., 333.
7 For a detailed textual genealogy of the subsidiarity principle in the European legal order, see
R. Schu¨tze, above n.2.
8 Protocol 30 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (1997).
9 D.Z. Cass, “The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of
Powers within the European Community” (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 1107.
10 G. Berman, “Proportionality and Subsidiarity” in C. Barnard & J. Scott (eds.), The Law of the
Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Oxford 2002), 75 at 86.
11 The idea of “political safeguards of federalism” was developed in the US American federal
context, see H. Wechsler, “The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government” (1954) 54 Columbia Law Review 543.
On the federal nature of the European Union, see Schu¨tze, above n.2, chapter 1.
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safeguard of federalism. The second option tries to “substantiate” the
principle by strengthening subsidiarity as a judicial safeguard of feder-
alism. In what ways would the Lisbon Treaty – if it enters into force –
take up these proposals? Would the subsidiarity principle emerge
strengthened? This is the question this (short) article will try to answer.
II. STRENGTHENING THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM
The Amsterdam Protocol confirmed the “procedural” nature of the
subsidiarity enquiry. Each institution was called upon to ensure that it
complies with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.12 “For
any proposed Community legislation, the reasons on which it is based
shall be stated with a view to justifying its compliance with the prin-
ciples of subsidiarity and proportionality; the reasons for concluding
that a Community objective can be better achieved by the Community
must be substantiated by qualitative or, wherever possible, quantitative
indicators.”13 These procedural obligations are subsequently specified
for each institution. The Commission must “justify the relevance of its
proposals with regard to the principle of subsidiarity; whenever
necessary, the explanatory memorandum accompanying a proposal
will give details in this respect”.14 The Council and the Parliament
“shall, as an integral part of the overall examination of Commission
proposals, consider their consistency with Article 5 of the Treaty”.15
The Protocol was infused, through and through, with the philosophy of
process federalism. Subsidiarity was – predominantly – a “political
question”.16
How could this procedural dimension be reinforced? The beloved
proposal in the last decade has been to integrate national parliaments
into the decision-making process of the European Union.17 It was
hoped that this idea would kill two birds with one stone. The pro-
cedural involvement of national parliaments promised to strengthen
the federal and the democratic safeguards within Europe. This could be
done in two ways. First, one could create a new European institution –
a Senate – that would assemble national parliamentarians. Second,
12 Amsterdam Protocol, Article 1.
13 Ibid., Article 4.
14 Ibid., Article 9.
15 Ibid., Article 11.
16 This view has had wide support from the academic side, see only: G. Berman, “Taking Subsidiarity
Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States” (1994) 94 Columbia
Law Review 331 at 336: “My basic view is that the Community should respond to this challenge by
recasting subsidiarity from a jurisdictional principle (that is, a principle describing the allocation
of substantive authority between the Community and the Member states) into an essentially
procedural one (that is, a principle directing the legislative institutions of the Community to engage
in a particular inquiry before concluding that action at the Community rather than Member State
level is warranted.)”
17 Cf. (Amsterdam) Protocol No 9 on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU.
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national parliaments as such could be integrated in the European
legislative process.
In the past, the idea to create a European Senate as a second par-
liamentary chamber had high political support.18 “At the root of all of
the proposals for a second chamber there seems to lie a perception that
there is a problem with the democratic legitimacy of the EU and its
institutions.”19 National parliaments were not directly involved in the
European legislative process and they lacked control over national
ministers voting in the Council. But is the creation of a European
Senate the best constitutional medicine for the alleged democratic
malaise? Would its involvement add a third source of democratic
legitimacy to the European Union?20 Serious doubts are in order. The
Senate idea would simply not solve the practical problems which it
seeks to address.21 And from a theoretical point of view, it makes little
sense. “[I]f the Council makes the law, and if Ministers in the Council
represent their national parliaments, how can their parliaments be
given a separate, valid legislative role”?22 Why should there be two
European institutions representing the national peoples? If the reason
for this functional doubling is the increased independence of national
governments from their national parliaments, why not strengthen the
national safeguards of democracy? A European Senate would thus not
add much democratic legitimacy to the European Union. The better
view has therefore concentrated on its potential function as a political
safeguard of federalism.23. Yet, the idea of a European Senate was soon
discarded on the road to reform.24
18 It had been suggested by various French political luminaries, but also by former Prime Minister
Tony Blair and the former President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel. For an overview of the
various proposals for a second chamber, see House of Lords, Select Committee on European
Union, Seventh Report (2001–02) (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldselect/
ldeucom/48/4801.htm), paras.7–21.
19 Ibid., para.26.
20 For an affirmative answer, see G. van der Schyff & G-J. Leenknegt, “The Case for a European
Senate: a Model for the Representation of National Parliaments in the European Union” (2007) 62
Zeitschrift fu¨r o¨ffentliches Recht 237 at 243 and 251.
21 For an analysis of this point, see House of Lords, above n.18, paras.40 et seq. The House of Lords
suggested that the Council should operate in a more transparent way. “Achieving greater
accountability would significantly help reconnection of citizens with the institutions of Europe
and provide important reassurance to the public about the working of their institutions.” “Our
recommendation is accordingly that member States’ governments should make every effort to
ensure that they are fully accountable to their national parliaments both in being scrutinised on
Council meetings in advance, and in reporting the outcome of Council meetings after the event.”
(Ibid., para.62).
22 Andrew Duff (MEP) as quoted in ibid., para.59.
23 This has been the theme of reform proposals by the French Senate, cf. Rapport d’information au
nom de la de´le´gation du Se´nat pour l’Union europe´enne sur une deuxieme chambre europe´enne
No. 381 (http://www.senat.fr/rap/r00-381/r00-381.html).
24 The European Convention had ruled out the creation of a new institution to monitor the
application of the principle of subsidiarity; cf. Conclusions of the Working Group IV on the Role of
National Parliaments, CONV 353/02, 11: “The majority of the members of the Group
recommended a “process based approach” for monitoring subsidiarity and proportionality by
national parliaments and rejected the idea of creating new permanent or ad hoc bodies or
institutions for this purpose.”
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The idea of involving national parliaments in the European legis-
lative procedure was – not unsurprisingly – celebrated as the best sol-
ution by the European Convention.25 “Such a mechanism would enable
national parliaments to ensure the correct application of the principle
of subsidiarity by the institutions taking part in the legislative process
through a direct relationship with the Community institutions.”26 This
procedural vision of subsidiary would find its way into the (failed)
Constitutional Treaty and now the (suspended) Lisbon Treaty.
National Parliaments are to be accorded an active role in the func-
tioning of the European Union “by seeing to it that the principle of
subsidiary is respected in accordance with the procedures provided for
in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality”.27
What would the Lisbon Protocol change?28 Did it offer the national
parliaments a veto right (hard constitutional solution) or only a
monitoring right (soft constitutional solution)? In addition to re-
affirming the procedural hurdles of the Amsterdam Protocol,29 the new
Protocol will strengthen the political safeguards of federalism by in-
volving the national parliaments as “watchdogs of subsidiarity”.30
According to Article 6, each national parliament may, within eight
weeks, produce a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that a
European legislative draft does not comply with the principle of sub-
sidiarity. Each national Parliament will thereby have two votes;31 and
25 “That a consensus in favour of empowering national parliaments emerged in the Convention is not
altogether surprising given that a majority of its full members, 56 out of 105, were representatives of
national parliaments.” (Cf. I. Cooper, “The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and
the Logic of Arguing in the EU” (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 281 at 288).
26 Conclusions of the Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, CONV 286/02, 5. For a critical
eye on the report, see the excellent analysis by S. Weatherill, “Using National Parliaments to
improve Scrutiny of the limits of EU Action” (2003) 28 European Law Review 909 at 909–10: “The
Working Group Report largely promoted an impression that the proper corrective to perceived
problems in today’s European Union is enhanced national “control” over the European
institutions. This is troublingly backward-looking. ‘Nationalising’ the context in which EU
decisions are taken may produce selfish State-centric outcomes which fail to pay heed to the need to
adjust political decision-making in line with the growth of economic and social activities
undertaken in the transnational domain. So greater involvement of national parliaments is not
necessarily a virtue.”
27 Article 12 (b) of the (Lisbon) TEU.
28 Lisbon Protocol No.2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
29 Article 5 of the new Protocol states: “Draft legislative acts shall be justified with regard to the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Any draft legislative act should contain a detailed
statement making it possible to appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality. This statement should contain some assessment of the proposal’s financial impact
and, in the case of a directive, of its implications for the rules to be put in place by Member States,
including, where necessary, the regional legislation. The reasons for concluding that a Union
objective can be better achieved at Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever
possible, quantitative indicators. Draft legislative acts shall take account of the need for any
burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, national governments,
regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be minimised and commensurate
with the objective to be achieved.”
30 I. Cooper, “The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity”, above n.25, at 281.
31 Article 7(1) of the Lisbon Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
Proportionality.
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where the negative votes amount to one third of all the votes allocated
to the national parliaments, the European Union draft “must be re-
viewed”. This is called the “yellow card” mechanism, since the Union
legislator “may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft”.32
The mechanism is strengthened in relation to legislative proposals
under the co-decision procedure; albeit, here, only a majority of the
votes allocated to the national parliaments will trigger it.33 Under this
“orange card” mechanism, the Commission’s justification for main-
taining the proposal as well as the reasoned opinions of the national
parliaments will be submitted to the Union legislator. The latter will
have to consider whether the proposal is compatible with the principle
of subsidiarity. Where one of its chambers finds that the proposal vi-
olates the principle subsidiarity, the proposal is rejected.34 While this
arrangement makes it – slightly – easier for the European Parliament
to reject a legislative proposal on subsidiarity grounds, it makes it –
ironically – more difficult for the Council to block a proposal on the
basis of subsidiarity than on the basis of a proposal’s lack of substan-
tive merit.35
The Lisbon Protocol rejects the idea of a “red card” mechanism.
The rejection of a hard procedural solution is bemoaned by some as the
chosen procedural safeguards would “add very little” to the federal
control of the Union legislator.36 Others have – rightly – greeted the
fact that the envisaged mechanism will leave the political decision on
subsidiarity ultimately to the European legislator. “[T]o give national
parliaments what would amount to a veto over proposals would be
incompatible with the Commission’s constitutionally protected inde-
pendence”.37 Indeed, “a veto power vested in national Parliaments
would distort the proper distribution of power and responsibility in the
EU’s complex but remarkably successful system of transnational
governance by conceding too much to State control.”38 To have made
national parliaments “co-legislators” in the making of European law
32 Ibid., Article 7 (2). The threshold is lowered to a quarter for European laws in the area of freedom,
security and justice.
33 Ibid., Article 7(3).
34 Ibid., Article 7 (3) (b): “if, by a majority of 55% of the members of the Council or a majority of the
votes cast in the European Parliament, the legislator is of the opinion that the proposal is not
compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, the legislative proposal shall not be given further
consideration”.
35 For an analysis of this point, see G. Barrett, “‘The King is Dead, Long live the King’: the Recasting
by the Treaty of Lisbon of the Provisions of the Constitutional Treaty concerning National
Parliaments” (2008) 33 European Law Review 66 at 80–1. In the light of the voting threshold, “it
seems fair to predict that blockade of legislative proposals under Article 7(2) is likely to be a highly
exceptional and unusual situation”.
36 Thirty-third Report of House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee: Subsidiarity, National
Parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200708/
cmselect/cmeuleg/563/563.pdf), para.35.
37 A. Dashwood, “The Relationship between the Member states and the European Union/
Community” (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 355 at 369.
38 S. Weatherill, above n.26 at 912.
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would have aggravated the “political interweaving” of the European
and the national level and thereby further deepened joint-decision
traps.39 Lisbon will thus continue to “proceduralise” subsidiarity with-
out turning the principle into a hard and fatally efficient political
safeguard of federalism. The soft constitutional solution will thereby
channel national parliaments’ scrutiny to where it can be most useful
and effective: on their respective national governments.
III. STRENGTHENING THE JUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM
Past constitutional practice has concentrated on the procedural di-
mension of the subsidiarity principle. Has European constitutionalism
thus rejected the judicial dimension and fully embraced the philosophy
of “process federalism”? The Amsterdam Protocol had expressly ac-
knowledged the possibility of judicial review in the Community legal
order: “Compliance with the principle of subsidiarity shall be reviewed
in accordance with the rules laid down by the Treaty”.40 This had called
on the European Court of Justice. Yet, the Court would only listen
with one ear and leave the substantive subsidiarity analysis in the hands
of the Community legislator.41 However, the parallel application of
political and judicial safeguards of federalism will be confirmed by the
Lisbon Protocol.42 But more than that: the European Convention had
raised the argument that “judicial review carried out by the Court of
Justice concerning compliance with the principle of subsidiarity could
be reinforced”.43
How could the judicial safeguards of federalism be reinforced? One
idea has proposed an ex ante judicial review on subsidiarity grounds.44
Modelled on the ex ante jurisdiction of the Court for international
39 On the concept and shortfalls of Politikverflechtung, see F. W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap:
Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration” (1988) 66 Public Administration
239.
40 Ibid., Article 13. See also Edinburgh European Council Conclusions, Annex 1: Overall Approach to
the Application by the Council of the Subsidiarity Principle and Article 3b of the Treaty on European
Union, Bulletin of the European Communities, 12-1992, 12 at 14: “The principle of subsidiarity
cannot be regarded as having direct effect: however, interpretation of this principle, as well as
review of compliance with it by the Community institutions are subject to control by the Court of
Justice, as far as matters falling within the Treaty establishing the European Community are
concerned.”
41 For an analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court, see R. Schu¨tze, above n.2.
42 Article 8 of the Lisbon Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality: “The Court of Justice shall
have jurisdiction in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a
legislative act, brought in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 163 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union by Member states, or notified by them in accordance with
their legal order on behalf of their national Parliaments or a chamber thereof.”
43 Conclusions of the Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, CONV 286/02 at 7 (emphasis
added).
44 J.P. Jacque´ & J.H.H. Weiler, “On the Road to European Union – A new judicial Architecture: An
Agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference” (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review 185 at
204–6.
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agreements,45 this would allow the Court to subject a European bill to a
subsidiarity review prior to its entry into force. A second proposal
reified this idea by suggesting an independent new Court specialised in
questions of competence and subsidiarity.46 The Convention discarded
both suggestions on the ground “that the introduction of a judicial
review in the legislative phrase would be tantamount to the monitoring
of subsidiarity losing its primarily political nature”.47 But then, how
could ex post judicial review of subsidiarity be reinforced? In order to
answer this question, we need to take a step back and ask – again –
what the subsidiarity principle is and what we want it to do.
The Court, and much of the academic literature,48 makes a
distinction between “whether” the Community should exercise its
competence and “how” it does it. The former is conceptualised as
subsidiarity the latter is viewed as proportionality. This distinction
is misleading. Subsidiarity must be understood in terms of federal
proportionality. Why? There are two reasons – one theoretical and one
conceptual. Theoretically, a subsidiarity principle that concentrates on
the “whether” of Community action operates within a philosophy of
dual federalism. It is based on the either-or logic in which certain
objectives should not involve the European Community or theMember
States at all. By excluding the Community from the scene, subsidiarity
sensu stricto protects a sphere in which the Member States can exclus-
ively exercise their competences. And by insisting that certain objectives
are “Community objectives” as they can only be achieved by the
Community, the Court equally constructs a sphere in which only the
European Union can operate.
But more importantly: on a conceptual level, it is impossible to
reduce subsidiarity to “whether” the Community should exercise one
of its competences. This follows from the constitutional structure of
Article 5 EC, which distinguishes three constitutional principles: enu-
meration, subsidiarity, and proportionality. Where the Union enjoys a
competence it is entitled to generally act within an area. The general
“whether” of Union action is thus already answered for that policy
area. The distinction between “competence” and “subsidiarity” –
between Article 5(1) and 5(2) EC – will thus only make sense if the
subsidiarity principle concentrates on the “whether” of the specific act
45 Article 300(6) EC: “The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or a Member State
may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible
with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of Justice is adverse, the
agreement may enter into force only in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European
Union.”
46 J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge 1999), 322.
47 Conclusions of the Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, CONV 286/02 at 9.
48 For an exception to the rule, see G. de Bu´rca, Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after
Amsterdam, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 1999/07.
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at issue. But the “whether” and the “how” of the specific action are
inherently tied together. The principle of subsidiarity will thus ask
whether the European legislator has unnecessarily restricted national
autonomy. A subsidiarity analysis that will not question the federal
proportionality of a European law is bound to remain an empty
formalism. Subsidiarity properly understood is federal proportionality.
What, then, is the difference between subsidiarity in Article 5(2) and
proportionality in Article 5(3) EC? The answer is that both principles
share a family resemblance.49 The proportionality principle was his-
torically designed to safeguard liberal values. Proportionality would
protect private rights against excessive public interference.50 The idea of
excessive government interference can be extended into a federal con-
text. But here it is not the individual autonomy of a person, but the
collective autonomy of a people that is protected. In addition to its
liberal dimension, the principle of proportionality may thus receive a
federal dimension.51 But this federal proportionality is the principle
of subsidiarity; and to draw a line between proportionality and
subsidiarity, the best solution would be to restrict the principle of
proportionality in Article 5(3) EC to its liberal dimension. The consti-
tutional triumvirate of Article 5 EC could thus be explained as follows:
the enumeration principle will tell us whether the Community can act
within a policy field. The subsidiarity principle would examine whether
the European law disproportionally restricts national autonomy; and
the principle of proportionality would, finally, tell us whether the
European law unnecessarily interfered with liberal values.
But even if the Court comes to embrace subsidiarity as federal
proportionality, what principles could assist it in reinforcing judicial
review of subsidiarity? American federalism has never expressly re-
cognised the existence of a principle of subsidiarity in theory or prac-
tice.52 However, two indirect inspirations may still be distilled from
the jurisprudence of the American Supreme Court. They are the
“clear statement rule” and the “presumption against pre-emption”.
The former is a judicial safeguard to maintain the political safeguards
of federalism. Congress must state its intention to pre-empt State
law clearly; for “to give the state-displacing weight of federal law to
mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for
49 On the concept of “family resemblance”, see L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford
2001), ·65–71.
50 On the origin of the concept, see J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law (London 2006), 678–9.
51 The principle of subsidiarity may also have a liberal dimension in the sense of protecting individuals
or private groups from unnecessary public intervention. However, this liberal dimension of
subsidiarity is not codified in Article 5 (2) EC.
52 G. Berman, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, above n.16 at 403: “not only would the European not
have found subsidiarity in the lexicon of US constitutional law, but they would not have found it to
be a central feature of US constitutional practice”.
C.L.J. Subsidiarity after Lisbon 533
lawmaking”.53 The presumption against pre-emption goes slightly fur-
ther than this.54 It adds a substantive value in favour of State legislation
and forms part of a “normative canon designed to protect federalism
values”. “As such, the presumption against preemption is much like a
number of other rules of construction derived from constitutional
values, such as the rule of lenity in criminal law[.]”55
These two American devices can, without much effort, be translated
into European safeguards of federalism. The Court could insist on
express pre-emption before concluding that a European law occupied
the field. It could equally develop a judicial presumption against pre-
emption in certain policy areas. Indeed, it has been argued that the
subsidiarity principle as such should function as the textual foundation
of a presumption in favour of national responsibility.56 Yet, these
two devices would only provide for a soft constitutional solution: the
subsidiarity-inspired interpretation of European legislation. What
about situations in which the European legislator spoke clearly and
expressly field-pre-empted national legislators in violation of the sub-
sidiarity principle? Then, the European Court would face a choice. It
could conceive the judicial safeguards of federalism as mere “resistance
norms”, that is “constitutional rules that make governmental action
more difficult, but do not categorically exclude it”.57 This is the present
American solution.58 Alternatively, it could – and should – outlaw
disproportionate interferences into national legislative autonomy.
However, this hard constitutional solution will imply that the Court
abandons its manifest-error standard in relation to the question of
subsidiarity. The Court would need to develop a stricter standard for
the federal proportionality review. The fact that the latter may depart
from the laxer standard for the liberal proportionality principle is no
constitutional anomaly.59 However, the hard constitutional solution
would mean that the Court of Justice gets involved in fundamental
53 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 US 452 (1991), 464 (quoting L. H. Tribe).
54 The Supreme Court has found a presumption against pre-emption in areas of traditional State
police powers. For an analysis of this case law, see R. Schu¨tze, above n.2, chapter 2.
55 E.A. Young, “Two Cheers for Process Federalism” (2001) 46 Villanova Law Review 1349 at
1387–8.
56 E.A. Young, “Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary
Tales from American Federalism” (2002) 77 New York University Law Review 1612 at 1717:
“[T]he introduction of the principle of subsidiarity into the EU treaties at Maastricht provides
substantial support for a shift in interpretive principles. If anything, the underlying legal texts offer




59 The co-existence of two or more judicial review standards is well-established in American
constitutional law, see United States v. Caroline Products, 304 US 144 (1938), 152 fn.4 (1938). This
is perhaps the most famous footnote in American constitutional law.
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political and social questions. But this is – after all – what constitutional
courts do.
IV. CONCLUSION
The constitutionalisation of the principle of subsidiarity came at a time,
when the European Community resolutely continued its path away
from decisional intergovernmentalism. With the political safeguards of
federalism in the Council loosened, a new constitutional principle was
searched for to protect the Member States from the dangers of over-
centralisation. As a constitutional principle, subsidiarity was designed
to safeguard legislative space for the Member States by restricting
European legislation to situations, where “the objectives of the pro-
posed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action,
be better achieved by the Community”.60
In the past, the procedural dimension of subsidiarity has been the
dominant perspective. Recent reform proposals have, consequently,
aimed to strengthen this dimension by involving the national parlia-
ments as watchdogs of subsidiarity. The Lisbon Protocol on the
Application of the Principle of Subsidiary and Proportionality would
create a “yellow” and an “orange” card mechanism. The rejection
of the “red card” option is to be welcomed. The hard constitutional
solution would not have offered a third source of legitimacy and the
soft constitutional solution will channel the energy of national parlia-
ments to where it primarily belongs: the control of their national
governments. Lisbon would add an additional monitoring task, but
this European task should only supplement their national responsi-
bility.
The Lisbon arrangements may also call upon the Court to reinforce
the judicial control of subsidiarity. The Court, too, would have a choice
between a soft and a hard constitutional solution. The European Court
could – like the American Supreme Court – essentially view the sub-
sidiarity principle as a presumption against pre-emption. (While the
Court has not pronounced on the issue, past judicial practice may be
seen as a manifestation of its implicit acceptance.) However, pre-
sumptions can be overturned; and for that reason this article has
argued in favour of a hard constitutional solution. In federal contexts,
exclusively process-based theories of judicial review are misplaced as
there are two democratic processes that claim authority.61 A strength-
ened judicial commitment towards substantive subsidiarity will not
60 Article 5 (2) EC.
61 On this point, see R. Schu¨tze, “On ‘Federal Ground’: The European Union as an (Inter)national
Phenomenon” (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 1069 at 1099–1102.
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mean revolutionary change. European constitutionalism has already
made a commitment in that direction. Instead of leaving the federal
philosophy to the political safeguards of federalism alone, the
European legal order has already accepted substantive limits on the
European legislator in the form of complementary competences.62
62 On the nature of these competences in the European legal order, see R. Schu¨tze, above n.2.
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